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Shifting Tides: 
China and North Korea
Zhu Feng
The decision by Kim Jong Il’s regime to test launch missiles on July 5 and 
to test a nuclear device on Oct. 9, 2006, dramatically impacted China’s foreign 
policy toward North Korea. These incidents have served to undermine the 
six-party talks hosted by China and threaten to further exacerbate the forces 
destabilizing regional security in Northeast Asia.  Pyongyang’s defiance of  
China’s stern warnings regarding these tests has finally signaled to Beijing that 
the “North Korea crisis” is catastrophically deteriorating.
Following both the missile and nuclear tests, China voted in favor of  UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1705 and 1718, clearly indicating that Beijing 
is seeking new policies to deal with North Korea. There remains a degree of  
internal discussion on what that policy direction should be and the nature 
China’s relations to the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea (DPRK). For 
a variety of  reasons, a residual sympathy for North Korea remains in China 
that is preventing a showdown between Beijing and Pyongyang. Yet China is 
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decisively working to expand its cooperation with the international commu-
nity to force North Korea to discontinue its pursuit of  nuclear weapons and 
lower the threat arising from its weapons of  mass destruction. Furthermore, 
if  China’s own complex domestic and international cost-benefit calculus can 
be untangled, a significant shift in Beijing’s policy – entailing abandonment 
of  its patron relationship with North Korea and coercion to roll back nuclear 
capabilities – may be just around the corner.
Missile Tests: A Turning Point
The DPRK’s last three missile tests conducted since the outbreak of  the 
North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002 had limited diplomatic impact 
mainly because the test launches involved only short-range or shore-based 
anti-ship missiles.1 Since North Korea already possessed such missile capabili-
ties there was no evidence that North Korean missile technology had improved 
substantively since the Taepodong-1 was test fired in 1998. However, when 
intelligence confirmed that North Korea was going to test-fire long-range 
missiles in June 2006 capable of  reaching the west coast of  the United States 
the reactions of  the United States and Japan fundamentally changed. These 
tests were also significant because they damaged Beijing’s credibility as a me-
diator and decreased its presumed influence on North Korea.
Following the long-rage missile tests on July 5, 2006, an intense debate 
arose in the United States regarding the possibility of  using a preemptive 
strike on North Korean missile facilities. Although the possibility of  such 
a strike was ultimately ruled out by the White House, the United States an-
nounced that the missile defense system in Alaska would enter a higher alert 
level. In addition, the United States and Japan decided to step up deployment 
of  missile defenses in Japan, and the United States sent its only Aegis cruiser 
equipped with a marine missile defense system into the offshore waters of  
North Korea. All these moves point to a marked escalation of  the military 
confrontation revolving around the North Korean missile launch – a situation 
China had been working to avoid with its mediation efforts in the North 
Korean nuclear crisis and by hosting the six-party talks. 
The possibility of  North Korea’s long range missile tests did not at first 
draw a particularly swift or strong response from Beijing as it has grown ac-
customed to such tactics of  intimidation so often employed by the DPRK 
whenever the six-party talks stagnate. It was difficult to tell whether this par-
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ticular test-launch of  missiles by North Korea was yet another bluff  in order 
to pressure the United States to lift the financial sanction against it.
China’s reaction began to change, however, with the continuous string of  
reports regarding the imminent tests that were published in June of  2006. For 
the first time, the Chinese premier openly demanded North Korea to halt its 
erroneous action. On June 28, 2006, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao openly called 
on North Korea to stop the test launch in an attempt to avoid Chinese domes-
tic alarm at growing tensions in the Sino-DPRK relationship.2 This reaction 
was unprecedented as China’s senior leaders had never officially demanded 
anything of  the DPRK, even when it withdrew from the nuclear Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of  Nuclear Weapons, or 
reopened its 5-megawatt graphite reactor 
or when it declared possession of  nuclear 
weapons in February 2005.
The reasons for China’s change of  po-
sition are numerous. First, it is important 
to note that the Chinese leadership’s direct 
call for a halt on the missile testing came after South Korea’s explicit request to 
China through official channels to prevent Pyongyang from carrying out the 
test launch. Since the second round of  six-party talks on the North Korean 
nuclear issue in February 2004, China and South Korea have been moving 
ever closer in their approach and coordination of  policies. Considering South 
Korea’s deep concern over the test launch, its direct request for Beijing to take 
action against this provocative move by the DPRK was a request that China 
could not decline. 
Secondly, Beijing had become painfully aware of  the significance of  North 
Korea’s test of  a long-range missile (the Taepodong-2). This would be an 
open provocation by Pyongyang, after which China would have little reason 
to further cushion the DPRK from the United States and Japan.  Prior to 
this, Beijing had been hoping to “comfort” North Korea through softening 
the “pressure and isolation” policy adopted by the United States and Japan 
and protect North Korea from any further setback and harm. With Japan’s 
extreme sensitivity to Pyongyang’s missile test launching, the firing of  the 
new Taepodong-2 missile would only provide a pretext for Japan to acceler-
ate its cooperation with Washington in developing ballistic missile defense, 
enhance the U.S.-Japan military alliance and promote Japan’s plan to intensify 
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its military development plan. These developments would in turn complicate 
China’s Japan policy considerably. Due to the current tension in Sino-Japanese 
relations, any moves by Japan’s military have the potential of  stirring domestic 
nationalism in China that runs high with anti-Japanese sentiments. These 
changes in China’s security environment would provide a basis for the Chinese 
military to demand a bigger budget and scale up military forces. The Chinese 
leadership headed by Hu Jintao (China’s President) does not want to see the 
escalation of  military confrontation between China and other big powers in 
the region, nor does it want China’s defense strategy to be manipulated by the 
internal nationalist passions.
North Korea’s missile tests have diverse implications for China. First, the 
missile tests show that Pyongyang has little regard for China’s own security 
interests. Beijing is deeply frustrated by the intransigent behavior and thinking 
of  Pyongyang despite five rounds of  six-party talks and the signing of  the Joint 
Statement in September 2005. China had hoped that it could influence North 
Korea through a multilateral mechanism to create – and make routine – an 
exchange acceptable both to North Korea 
and the other parties.  China’s strategy in 
attaining these goals can be characterized 
as a “soft approach,” aiming to arrive at 
a diplomatic solution, gradually but con-
cretely affecting North Korea’s actions. 
China, time and again, sternly rejected calls 
by the United States to increase pressure 
on Pyongyang and even took various ac-
tions to protect North Korea from further 
isolation. At the same time, China teamed up with South Korea, continuously 
providing North Korea with substantial aid, supporting South Korea’s “peace 
and prosperity policy” toward North Korea and respecting the requirements 
of  Kim for a “security assurance” and “fair treatment”. The quid pro quo 
of  such an approach, however, was the willingness by North Korea to fully 
cooperate with China and South Korea, to give up its brinksmanship behavior 
and respect China’s role as host of  the six-party talks. The launching of  the 
missiles shows undeniably that Pyongyang not only lacks a basic appreciation 
of  China’s painstaking efforts on its behalf, but contempt for China’s security 
interests in Northeast Asia. 
The missile tests shook 
the Chinese leadership’s 
belief in the Kim Jong Il 
regime’s ability to carry 
out reform in emulation of 
China’s model.
Zhu Feng
39China Security  Autumn  2006
The missile tests also deeply shook the Chinese leadership’s belief  in the 
Kim Jong Il regime’s ability to carry out reform and opening up in emulation 
of  China’s model.  The Chinese people also hold highly negative views of  
the Pyongyang regime. A recent public opinion poll shows that 44 percent of  
Chinese people dislike North Korea more than any other country (closely fol-
lowing Japan, which 56 percent of  people polled most disliked). Conversely, 
among the three East Asian nations, South Korea is considered by the Chinese 
public as the country that China most needs to deepen bilateral relations (48 
percent), followed by Japan (40 percent), and North Korea a distant last (12 
percent). 3
The Chinese leadership now understands it may have deluded itself  
about the Kim government. Beijing has pursued a good neighborly policy 
with North Korea, thinking that Pyongyang would gradually be won over 
by China’s kindness. However, the missile tests have finally revealed to the 
leadership in Beijing the true nature of  the Kim government. North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions stem in large part from the need to safeguard the regime’s 
own security and interests rather than its country and people. It has also shown 
itself  to be highly skilled in its resistance to internal reform.4 Pyongyang 
has refused to accept China’s advice and 
continues to take measures that intensifies 
confrontation and defies the international 
community. This can only mean that the 
current mentality of  DPRK leaders is sim-
plistic and arrogant. Pyongyang will not in 
the end give serious consideration or cater 
to the interests of  China or take decisive steps on the road of  reform and 
opening. Beijing now objectively concedes that it is fantasy to expect the Kim 
government to make wise decisions and restart the process of  merging itself  
into the world community.
Soon after the missile tests of  July 5, 2006, China voted in favor of  UN 
Security Council Resolution 1695 (which condemned DPRK’s missile launches 
and imposed limited sanctions on North Korea), clearly indicating the most 
significant change of  China’s policy toward North Korea in recent years. It 
signifies China’s growing resentment toward North Korea and implies an 
end to China’s “umbrella” policy for North Korea, a policy that has been in 
effect since the end of  the Cold War and meant to prevent the UN Security 
Council from getting entangled in North Korean affairs, and protect North 
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Korea from UN sanctions. With North Korea’s deep dependence on China’s 
economic and diplomatic assistance, anything that causes China to distance 
itself  from Pyongyang will no doubt have implications for the survival of  the 
Kim government. From Pyongyang’s perspective, Beijing’s support of  the 
resolution was an act of  treachery by its socialist big brother. China’s refusal 
to continue as North Korea’s ‘protector’ in the Security Council opens the 
door for the possibility of  new, tougher UN sanctions.
The Nuclear Equation: A New Era
China’s ire over North Korea’s missile test had not yet subsided when the 
DPRK decided to test a nuclear bomb on Oct. 9, 2006. In Beijing, ire turned 
into fury. Pyongyang’s nuclear test was a reckless violation of  the September 
2005 Joint Statement and squandered Beijing’s good will policy to accommo-
date Pyongyang in their legitimate pursuit of  security guarantees and national 
interests demands. It was no less than a slap in China’s face. The test shows 
that Pyongyang has been genuinely indifferent to China’s continuous opposi-
tion and warnings against the DPRK’s pursuit of  nuclear weapons. There is 
little doubt that the North Koreans consider their nuclear capability more im-
portant than their friendship with its only patron state, China. Without ques-
tion, Beijing has become fully disillusioned 
about the nature of  the Kim government, 
and has come to recognize that its previous 
nuclear appeasement policy for the North 
must come to an end.  
There is a range of  speculation as to why 
Kim risked jettisoning China’s long-term 
support in favor of  going nuclear. Some in 
China argue that Kim did not believe that 
Beijing would truly punish him by cutting 
off  oil and other provisions. Certainly, Pyongyang is convinced that an anti-
American North Korea has been a valuable strategic buffer for China vis-à-vis 
the United States’ military presence in East Asia. Kim likely calculated that 
China would never abandon him for this reason. Others contend that Kim 
and his diplomats frequently hint to China that Pongyang will do an about-
face and embrace the United States if  China pushes too hard. In this way, 
Pyongyang probably believes it holds a ‘trump card’ over Beijing by playing 
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such cat and mouse tricks. His gamble has proved him wrong. Following the 
nuclear test, the traditionally defined ‘friendship’ between the two countries 
has evaporated. Even though Beijing did not fully flex its muscle against the 
DPRK, the reality is that Chinese leaders’ resolve to dismantle the North 
Korean nuclear program has intensified. Beijing’s harsh words of  protest on 
the nuclear test fully reinforce this. China 
called Pyongyang’s action “flagrant” (悍
然), a word that is normally employed 
only for criticizing actions by an adversary, 
a clear break from past language by the 
Chinese leadership, and a lucid expression 
of  dissatisfaction and even resentment 
toward Kim. 
China’s interest in preventing North Korea from developing nuclear weap-
ons is fundamentally not different from Japan and the United States. Although 
Beijing is not willing to speak with one voice alongside Tokyo and Washington 
in public statements and therefore its opposition and threats toward North 
Korea are watered down to some extent, a North Korea with nuclear weapons 
is unacceptable to China. 
Of  primary concern, in Beijing’s judgment, is that the DPRK’s nuclear 
test has decisively shifted the nature of  the problem from the ‘North Korean 
nuclear issue,’ which has revolved around concerns over nuclear proliferation, 
to the far more dangerous and broad ‘North Korean issue.’ China has long 
tried to limit its approach with North Korea to the nuclear issue rather than 
the comprehensive problems – regime legitimacy, its refusal to end the Cold 
War on the Korea Peninsula and integrating itself  into the regional community, 
unpredictability of  its behavior – fearing negative influence on Sino-North 
Korean relations and a destabilization of  the DPRK regime itself. 
If  North Korea fully develops and possesses nuclear weapons then fissures 
in the geopolitical landscape of  East Asia will emerge. In the long run, this 
will negatively affect China’s strategic interests. First of  all, since the brunt of  
dealing with a nuclear North Korea in the region will primarily fall to China 
and South Korea they will have to strengthen their coordination efforts to this 
end. China simply cannot shoulder the burden alone. A closer China-South 
Korean cooperation could alert Japan and further drive the U.S.-Japanese 
military alliance. On the other hand, North Korea’s nuclear tests will also 
cause Japan to accelerate its conventional military buildup as well as reopen 
A Japan rearmed with 
nuclear weapons is 
entirely unacceptable
to China.
Shifting Tides
42 China Security  Autumn  2006
the debate in Japan on its pursuit of  nuclear weapons. This will instigate a 
backlash in China and South Korea, further aligning the two countries while 
driving a bigger wedge between them and Japan. A Japan rearmed with nuclear 
weapons is entirely unacceptable to China, but may be welcome to the United 
States. This divergence of  interests will lead to increased divisions between 
China-South Korea on the one side and the 
United States and Japan on the other – a 
separation between continent states versus 
sea powers.
A nuclear North Korea will have its 
greatest direct impact on the relationship 
between Japan and China and each country’s domestic reactions to develop-
ments. The problem of  North Korea is a double-edged sword and has the 
potential of  either promoting or seriously harming Sino-Japanese relations. 
Naturally, China’s hope is that the North Korea problem will become the 
lubricant for better communication between the two countries. It could be 
a catalyst for greater discourse over regional security and cooperation. This 
environment probably won’t lead to breakthroughs on the historical issues, 
but may be a beginning in bringing the two closer. On the other hand, there is 
a real danger for a worsening of  Sino-Japanese ties if  a spirit of  cooperation 
is lacking; Japan’s tough stand toward North Korea unsettles China because 
Japan also has strong nationalist sentiments against China, which will inevi-
tably instigate similar nationalist response from China, further engendering 
hostility toward one another. 
As for China and the United States, while the recent events are an impor-
tant factor between them, their relationship also has a dynamic that is sub-
stantially independent of  the North Korean issue. There is no question that 
American policy towards North Korea has been a failure and conservatives 
and moderates in the United States continue to be divided over China’s role in 
the North Korean nuclear issue. As serious as it is, the side effects in solving 
this problem will not hugely impact the Sino-U.S. relationship in the near and 
medium term. Nevertheless, in this context, there are many uncertainties for 
China’s national security if  force is used to resolve the North Korean nuclear 
issue. One great uncertainty is what orientation North Korea will take. In the 
past 40 years, resistance against America was the basis of  Sino-North Korean 
friendship. But in 1992, by establishing diplomatic relations with South Korea, 
China sent a clear message that it would not support North Korea’s extreme 
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anti-American stance. This action by China was regarded by North Korea as 
a betrayal and its distrust still factors in Pyongyang’s thoughts. If  China uses 
force to dissuade North Korean nuclear aspirations it is possible China would 
not only ‘lose’ North Korea but the country could become anti-Chinese in 
nature. Most Chinese policymakers are loathe to see this happen. Another 
uncertainty comes from America’s future military presence in the Korean 
Peninsula. Will it decrease or increase? If  China and the United States can 
come to a consensus on North Korea, a future North Korean regime would 
at least not be hostile to China, alleviating one of  China’s principal concerns.
Most critical from Beijing’s perspective is to confirm whether and to what 
extent the United States will commit to collaborating with China in firmly 
yet constructively rolling-back North Korea’s nuclear program. Until this 
point, Beijing has not received sufficiently clear signals from Washington on 
its real intention to dismantle the DPRK’s nuclear capability. That confirma-
tion and trust notably revolves around America’s resolve to settle the issue as 
well as its willingness to share in the costs and responsibilities of  any lasting 
solution. One of  Beijing’s greatest fears is that if  China was at the forefront 
of  any confrontation with the DPRK, the United States would back down 
and Beijing would be caught flatfooted to 
deal with North Korea alone. Beijing and 
Washington may be trapped in a dilemma 
where each side is unwilling to get too close 
to one another and act together decisively 
to deal with North Korea due to the logic 
of  great power politics.  
Perhaps the greatest casualty of  North Korea’s nuclear tests has been the 
six-party talks. Some in the United States have wanted to kick-start such a 
mechanism with China at the helm. However, this was always a false hope. It 
was never going to be realized in the medium- or near-term without strong 
buttressing by others, especially the United States. As a regional security co-
ordination mechanism, China has been carefully examining the six-party talks 
and their potential. However, the reality is that a regional security structure 
evolving from the six-party talks is not something China can do by relying on 
its own strength, nor is it a mechanism in China’s interests. It is not practical 
and is therefore no longer a policy priority for China.
President George W. Bush has said the six-party talks are the best way 
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to solve the North Korea problem, to which Japan and South Korea have 
agreed as well. All are talking about a multilateral security mechanism in East 
Asia, however, neither the United States, Japan or South Korea has a feasible 
blueprint. Therefore, such a regional security mechanism has lost substantial 
attraction to China. 
The current state is that the six-party talks cannot reach any agreement and 
cannot solve the problem effectively. Yet, they will not disappear in practice 
because any progress on the North Korean issue must be the result of  agree-
ment by the six parties. Unfortunately, the result will be temporary paralysis. 
Internal Dynamics
The question of  how China’s policies toward North Korea are determined 
is not straightforward. First of  all, the current policies adopted by Beijing are 
not dominated by military authorities. North Korea is now considered far less 
of  a vital strategic “buffer zone,” than it was in the past. Any ultimate decision 
regarding Beijing’s policy toward North Korea is directly subject to judgment 
and selection at the highest level, yet, the influence over that policy has always 
oscillated between the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, which focuses on coordina-
tion with the international community, and the International Department of  
the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (CCPCC), which stresses 
the relationship between China and North Korea. While the former camp 
can hardly be called a ‘pro-West’ group it does advocate coordination with the 
West. The latter camp, on the other hand, can be called ‘pro-Pyongyang’ and 
advocates strongly for cooperation with North Korea. 
The CCPCC’s International Department oversees exchange with other 
political parties and is generally sympathetic to North Korea, often calling 
for a strengthened relationship between the Chinese and the North Korean 
political parties and governments and advocating full “political trust” in 
Pyongyang. This pro-Pyongyang element also believes that North Korea will 
in the end accept China’s advice to reform and open up and that China has 
great influence over North Korea. 
Beginning with North Korea’s decision to launch the missile tests, and now 
the nuclear tests, the International Department has had declining influence 
on Beijing’s formulation of  policy toward North Korea. This is evidenced 
by the meeting held by the Central Committee on Foreign Affairs in late 
August of  2006, which said that China would adhere to its new concept for 
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diplomacy, including “taking the road of  peaceful development”, “opening 
up and mutual benefit”, “building of  a harmonious world”, and a “focus on 
the individual.”5 Most importantly, the conference proceedings proclaim that 
a nuclear North Korea is a formidable challenge to China’s “core interests.” 
In Beijing’s discourse, only Taiwan’s independence movement has been previ-
ously interpreted in that way. The gist of  these principles is that China will 
strengthen coordination of  its own diplomacy with that of  the mainstream of  
the international community. 
The policies currently being adopted by North Korea strongly conflict 
with China’s diplomatic goals and have greatly narrowed Beijing’s space for 
diplomatic maneuvering in the six-party talks. It has impaired Beijing’s ability 
to influence the United States, Japan and other hardliners to compromise 
with North Korea. These difficulties are plaguing China’s mediation efforts 
on the North Korean nuclear issue, generating unprecedented political pres-
sure within the government. However, the reassessment of  its North Korea 
policy does not automatically lead to more decisive and harsher actions against 
Pyongyang. It’s not so easy for the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao team (president 
and premier of  China) to stand up to the threat imposed by nuclear North 
Korea. Beijing is still weighing all options and considering the most workable 
roadmap to proceed with its policy objective of  denuclearization. Considering 
the delicacy and complexity of  its options, Beijing will not make up its mind 
quickly. But what is certain right now is 
that a nuclear North Korea holds bleak 
and adverse implications for China and 
threatens to undermine almost all ele-
ments of  Hu’s foreign policy strategy of  
a “harmonious world,” upon which he has 
invested a lot.6
The decision by the Hu government in 
May 2003 to mediate the North Korean 
nuclear crisis was a defining moment for Chinese diplomacy. It signaled that 
China would become more proactive and self-confident in its diplomatic 
efforts and strive to make innovative use of  China’s rising international influ-
ence toward playing a positive role in maintaining the country’s important 
peripheral diplomacy. This has been proven successful with the five rounds 
of  six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. This is why China’s 
participation in the six-party talks received extensive support in domestic 
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mainstream public opinion. However, some academic and policy circles in 
China have opposed the nation’s role as mediator, suggesting that Beijing’s 
hosting of  the six-party talks is tantamount to “a small horse pulling a large 
cart”, or China’s diplomatic clout is not sufficient for the task. 
In a similar vein, Hu’s proactive and rational international policy approach 
is facing new challenges. Some in China have expressed sympathy for North 
Korea, believing that its actions are still a kind of  support to China’s strategic 
position and even a counter-balance to the United States and Japan.7 Such 
voices have grown louder following the North Korean missile launch and did 
not fade even after the nuclear test by the DPRK. Some arguments, character-
ized as “conspiracy theory” (the United States deliberately delayed the resolu-
tion on the nuclear issue with North Korea in order to invigorate Japan’s 
rearming process) and “transference theory” (U.S. intentions to transfer more 
strategic pressure on China by broadening hostilities among East Asian re-
gional members) have arisen to contradict the Bush administration’s moderate 
response and non-military intimidation against North Korea.8 For the ossified 
forces within the conservative camp that were originally discontent with Hu 
and Wen and their new style government, the missile launches and nuclear test 
only provide them with new fodder for attacking the Hu-Wen team. In the 
run up to the 17th Party Congress, Chinese politics are now entering a sensi-
tive period. North Korea’s actions have, on balance, damaged the diplomatic 
prestige of  the Chinese reformists represented by Hu and Wen. If  China’s 
policy toward North Korea is dragged into the domestic struggle over politi-
cal power, the future orientation of  China’s diplomatic policies towards North 
Korea will become even more complicated.
Re-orienting China’s North Korean Policy
The test launch of  missiles by North Korea has shaken Beijing’s confidence 
in its past policy toward North Korea. The nuclear test conducted by North 
Korea was the last straw to substantively spur Beijing to rethink its relation-
ship with the North.
China has implemented a range of  measures in response to North Korea’s 
defiant attitude, its missile test firing as well as the negative consequences that 
may arise in North Korea’s internal situation as a result of  its actions. In terms 
of  its overall approach, following the missile test (and before the nuclear test), 
China began to initiate coercive diplomatic measures toward Pyongyang. This 
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can be seen by a number of  changes in China’s actions toward North Korea. 
In the first place, whereas trade between China and North Korea should 
theoretically be growing, it remained staganant between January and July of  
2006 and even decreased in key products such as iron, steel, chemical and plant 
products (see Appendix). China temporarily froze an existing agreement for 
a large-scale development project for border trade between the two countries. 
An important outcome of  Kim’s visit to China in January 2006 was to step-up 
economic and trade cooperation between the border cities and regions. A 
large-scale border trade summit was originally scheduled for September 2006, 
which would have been attended by high-ranking officials from both sides, 
but the meeting was cancelled.
Meanwhile, Beijing delayed large-scale aid measures for North Korea fol-
lowing the flood disaster in July and only initially provided some symbolic 
aid through the Red Cross. Although South Korea announced a large-scale 
aid worth 200 billion won, Beijing stated subsequently on Aug. 30 that “the 
Chinese government is very concerned about the disaster in North Korea, 
and has decided to give humanitarian as-
sistance, including grain, food, diesel and 
medicine,” although Beijing had yet to 
decide on specific amounts of  the goods.9 
China later decided to provide 50,000 tons 
of  aid, the equivalent of  half  of  South 
Korea’s aid. It is a rare occurrence that 
China lags behind South Korea in provid-
ing disaster relief  for North Korea and is 
a bellwether of  Beijing’s new tendency to use economic leverage to punish 
Pyongyang. 
Besides economic and aid measures, China has sent more troops to the 
Sino-North Korean border region. Although the Chinese media reported that 
China was sending reinforcements to the border and carrying out missile drills 
in Changbai Mountains in mid-July as part of  a “routine military exercise,” the 
fact is that China wants to enhance its ability to react in case of  a contingency 
involving North Korea.10 This does not represent the position of  the military, 
rather, it indicates that China’s senior leadership is very concerned about the 
possibility of  an emergency in North Korea and has to intensify any prepara-
tion for it in the days to come. 
How China addresses 
nuclear North Korea 
has more to do with its 
resolve and less to do 
with its policy.
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In addition, China has tightened visa management for North Koreans 
entering China to prevent the DPRK from making further use of  China as a 
conduit for illegal activities, such as the lynching of  its own citizens that try to 
seek sanctuary in China, and smuggling.
China is also, for the first time, participating in multilateral sanctions. But 
furthermore, China is carrying out bilateral sanctions against North Korea. 
China will not obstruct strict economic sanctions and may temporarily sus-
pend oil supplies to North Korea via the UN Security Council, though it 
would likely stop short of  allowing military action against the DPRK.
Yet, despite the tremendous diplomatic and political pressure exerted on 
China by the DPRK’s missile and nuclear tests, China’s leaders will continue 
to explore the boundaries of  influencing North Korea. Before the North 
Korean nuclear test, Beijing would not have pushed its close neighbor and 
“brother” into a corner because this would not only have contravened China’s 
own interests, but would have also departed from the broadly accepted think-
ing of  the Chinese people. However, if  sanctions cannot move North Korea 
to abandon its nuclear weapons, the possibility that China will employ other 
means to roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is real. If  this is 
the only alternative, China will use a variety of  methods to accomplish that 
goal, including coercive diplomacy and perhaps ultimately regime transforma-
tion. The crucial issue here is that China will have to make up its mind. 
How China addresses nuclear North Korea has more to do with its re-
solve and less to do with its policy. Prior to the nuclear test, Beijing saw no 
imperative to act decisively against North Korea. The situation has dramati-
cally changed however. Beijing has no alternative but to employ any and all 
means to get North Korea to return to its commitments to abandon nuclear 
weapons (exemplified in the September 2005 Joint Statement) and map out 
with other parties a feasible plan to trade its nuclear capabilities for economic 
compensation and diplomatic normalization. Thus, as Amb. Wang Guangya 
said at the UN, "no one is going to protect North Korea if  it continues with 
its bad behavior."11 Beijing has lost its patience and will not allow this issue to 
stagnate in multi-lateral talks. Presently, Hu looks like he has more resolve than 
ever to safeguard China against any diversion from the country’s economic 
construction. Firmly addressing a nuclear North Korea is a great test for Hu 
and for China. If  done successfully, it will add significantly to his capability 
and power within China and bolster China’s prestige internationally. 
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China’s Imports from North Korea from January to July 2005 and 2006 ($ in U.S. millions)
Jewelry and 
Precious Metal
Wood and 
Wooden Products
Chemical Products
Leather, Fur and Fur 
Products, Rubber
-72.90-48.56118.05566.616Animal Products
-15.96
Mineral Products
-44.939236.687281.626Total Value
% changeDifferenceProduct
Basic Metal
[Jan.-July 2006]
……
[Jan.-July 2005]
112.300
0.077
0.368
7.124
50.413
0.015
……
124.712
0.009
0.235
14.112
25.942
0.033
……
+12.412
-0.068
-0.113
+6.988
-24.471
+0.018
……
+11.05
-88.31
-30.71
+98.09
-48.54
+120.00
……
China’s Exports to North Korea from January to July 2005 and 2006 ($ in U.S. millions)
Basic Metal
Jewelry and 
Precious Metal
Fertilizer
Ceramics, Glass 
and Other Mineral 
Products
-14.23-3.37520.33923.714Food, Beverages, 
and Tobacco
+9.77
Mineral Fuel, 
Mineral Oil, Asphalt.
+60.398678.498618.100Summary
% changeDifferenceProduct
Machinery & 
Electronics
[Jan.-July 2006]
……
[Jan.-July 2005]
168.965
12.793
16.482
0.067
60.517
46.212
……
211.699
8.695
21.618
0.043
106.365
34.501
……
+42.73
-4.098
+5.136
-0.024
+45.848
-11.711
……
+25.29
-32.03
+31.16
-35.82
+75.76
-25.34
……
Source of  data: January - July 2006 statistics from China Customs
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